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RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/04/2018

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS

------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In the Matter of the Application of
JOSE DIAZ,

DECISION AND ORDER

Petitioner,

Index No. 2017/53088

-against-

TINA SANFORD, Chainvoman,
NYS BOARD OF PAROLE, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS &
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
Respondent.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
POSNER, J., ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

Petitioner commenced this Article 78 proceeding seeking an order reversing respondent's
(hereafter Parole Board) determination dated April 26, 2017 which denied him discretionary parole
release.
Mr. Diaz is currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility in Orange County. In
1990, at the age of 21, he drove by a corner store in the Bronx and fired shots at a rival drug dealer
standing outside. A stray bullet entered the store and killed Sean Healy, a Bronx Assistant District
Attorney. Mr. Diaz turned himself in after learning that he killed an innocent bystander and was
charged with murder. He was previously arrested for assault in 1988, at age nineteen, when he
intervened in a physical dispute between a female friend and a male friend, assaulting the male. In
1991, while detained at Riker's Island on the instant offense, he was charged with promoting prison
contraband for having razor blades in his cell.
Mr. Diaz accepted responsibility for his conduct and in Octoberl 991 pied guilty to three
charges: murder in the second degree; assault in the second degree; and attempted promoting prison
contraband in the first degree. Although the maximum penalty for the murder charge is 25 years to

1 of 10

INDEX NO. 2017-53088
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 39

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/04/2018

life, the District Attorney's office offered a negotiated sentence of fifteen years to life, the lowest
minimum for an indeterminate life sentence (PL § 70.00(3)(a)(i)), which the sentencing Court
imposed on November 29, 1991 1• The sentencing Judge stated to Mr. Diaz:
"[w]hether or not our penal system can have any positive effect upon you, Mr. Diaz,
will depend, of course, solely upon your own intent. You will have much time to
reflect upon your deeds and the fateful consequences of those deeds if you chose to
do so. You will also have opportunities while in prison to reflect upon the course of
your life and whether you will try in some measure to compensate for what you have
taken" (Sentencing Minutes, 11/29/9 l ).

Mr. Diaz has been in state prison custody since December 16, 1991. He will be 50 years old

this year and has been incarcerated for more than 27 years.
Mr. Diaz is an inmate who has used his time in prison well, engaging in numerous programs
and vocational training. To highlight a few of his achievements, he completed '·Road to
Redemption", a twelve-week victim awareness program in 2009 and then facilitated the group for
six years. He participated in ·'Breaking Barriers", an optional weekly course and taught others in
that program. He ·completed Aggression Replacement Therapy and numerous voluntary courses,
including obtaining certificates in AIDS counseling and education and Bible studies. Nineteen
program ce11ificates are attached to his petition as exhibits. He has served as an usher and worship
leader and has worked with families in the visiting room.
He has also worked in many capacities in the prison facilities including as a porter, house
clerk, and different industrial jobs. He obtained a New York State license in asbestos removal and
has been working in the Fishkill/Otisville Asbestos Control Program since March 2011.

1

Additionally. Mr. Diaz received definite sentences of six months and one year, respectively, on his
convictions for attempt to promote prison contraband and assault.
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Mr. Diaz has received numerous letters of support for parole release from prison officials,
who have observed him closely over many years and who describe him using words such as '·model
prisoner'', one who has a strong work ethic, respectful attitude, "one of the best inmates", a
"remarkable candidate for parole", and one, if given the right opportunity, who will be a "model
citizen". He has consistently expressed remorse for his crime and an understanding of the '·price one
must pay for his past". One officer noted that he had never seen an inmate more "emotionally
regretful for something he had done". Mr. Diaz's remorse is also evident from his own personal
statements and prior parole hearing transcripts.

Mr. Diaz has concrete release plans. His mother lives in the Bronx and her address has been
approved for release. He has extended family in the Bronx and they are ready to support and
facilitate his reentry. He has 3 job assurances, including one from his asbestos instructor and one
from a family friend who runs an asbestos removal contracting business, work that Mr. Diaz is
licenced to perform.
As to his disciplinary record, he had only one serious infraction more than 18 years ago and
a minor ticket for smoking cigarettes in 2009. He has not had any infractions since that time.
He received the lowest COMPAS score (" l ") in 10 out of 12 categories, and "2" on Risk of
Felony Violence and a "3" on History of Violence, something he cannot change. The COMPAS
assessment recommended a supervision level of "4", the lowest level of supervision, which is an
indication of a minimal risk to society and minimal risk ofre-offending (Matter o.fCiaprazi v. Evans,
52 Misc.3d 1212 [Sup. Ct, Dutchess County 2016]).
Mr. Diaz first became eligible for parole in June 2005. He was denied parole that year and
again in 2007. In 2009, the Board granted him parole release. However, soon after, following
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receipt of letters sent by the District Attorney's office and the victim' s family opposing his release,
the Board suspended the release date and then rescinded his parole. His 2011 appearance was
delayed pending appeal. The Board's detennination to rescind his parole was affirmed in December
2011 (see Diaz v. Evans, 90 AD3d 1371 [3d Dept 2011]).
Petitioner again appeared before the Board for release reconsideration in 2012, 2013, 2015
and 2017 and was denied each time. He is in his 28 1h year of incarceration on a life sentence in which
the Court, with the consent of the District Attorney's office, set a minimum of 15 years. The Court
notes with respect to his 2017 appearance for parole release consideration, the Board did not receive
any opposition from either the District Attorney or the victim's family.
His interview took place on April 25, 2017 and was conducted from Dutchess County by
video conference. The Board issued its decision on April 26, 2017, denying him release and ordering
him held for another 18 months. His next appearance before the Board will be in December 2018.
In its short two and a half page decision, the Board stated that after reviewing the record it
determined that ifreleased, at this time, "there is a reasonable probability that [the petitioner] would
not live and remain at liberty without, again, violating the law and that [his] release would be
incompatible with the welfare of society, and would so depreciate the serious nature of the crime as
to undermine respect for the law." The Board stated that it considered the statutory factors, listed
some ofthem, but offered no detail or explanation regarding the factors. The decision then addressed
the underlying crime. The Board did note that Mr. Diaz has expressed remorse, made an apology and
that there were letters of support and assurances, as well as letters ofopposition in the file. However,
no letters of opposition were received by the Board with respect to his 2017 application for parole,
a fact confirmed by counsel for the Parole Board at oral argument.

-4-
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The petitioner administratively appealed the Board's decision which was affirmed on August
4. 2017.
Petitioner now challenges the Board' s decision arguing that: the Board failed to follow its
statutory obligations and its own regulations; it failed to consider all of the statutory factors; it failed
to explain why it disregarded every one of Mr. Diaz's low COMPAS scores; it failed to discuss his
exemplary institutional record at the hearing and failed to give it appropriate consideration; the
Board failed to articulate in detail why Mr. Diaz was denied parole; its decision is conclusory and
is not supported by the record and is irrational, arbitrary and capricious; and reveals that the Board
did not address all the factors for discretionary release.
The respondent opposes the application, asserting in essence that the Court should defer to
the discretion of the Board; that the Board's decision is lawful and it considered the statutory factors;
and the weight given each factor is within the Board's discretion.
It is well-settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and if made in accordance with
the statutory requirements such detenninations are not subject to judicial review (Executive Law §
259-i[5]; Executive Law§ 59-i [2][c)[A]; Matter ofSilman v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000];

Matter of LeGeros v. NYS Bd. ofParole, 139 AD3d 1068 [2d Dept 2016)). However, the Board's
discretion is neither unfettered nor "unlimited" (see Matter ofBruetsch v. NYS Dept. ofCorr. and

Community Supervision, 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A), 2014 NY Slip Op 50755[U] [Sup Ct, Sullivan County
2014]).
Executive Law §259-i (2)(c)(A) requires a Parole Board to consider eight factors. The Board
must also consider whether:
"there is a reasonable probability that if such inmate is released, he
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
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deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law." (Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 NYCRR §8002.1).
Further, pursuant to Executive Law §259-c(4) the Board is to utilize procedures to "measure
the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons
upon release and assist members of the state board in determining which inmates may be released
to parole supervision."

The role of the Board is to determine whether, at the time ofthe hearing,

petitioner should be released, based upon consideration of the statutory factors (see Matier ofKing
v. NYS Div ofParole, 190 AD2d 423 [I st Dept. 1993] a.ff'd83 NY2d 788 [1994])(emphasis added)).
The weight to be accorded each of the requisite factors is within the Board's discretion and
it need not give each factor equal weight in rendering its decision (Matter of King, supra at 791;
A1atter ofColeman, 157 AD3d 672 (2d 2018]; Maller ofGoldberg v. NYS Bd. ofParole, 103 AD3d
634 (2d Dept 2013],- Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 946 (2d Dept 2010]). It is
permitted to weigh the serious nature of the crime more heavily than other more favorable factors
(see Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 (3d Dept 2013]; Matter ofDavidson v. Evans, 104
AD3d 1046, 1046 [3 d Dept 2013 ]). The Board is not required to a1iiculate the weight accorded each
factor it relied upon in rendering its decision (Matter ofGoldberg v. NYS Bd. ofParole, supra at 634;
Matter ofGelsomino v. NYS Bd. ofParole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2d Dept 2011]) or to discuss each
of the factors in its written decision (Matter of Marszalek v. Stanford, 152 AD3d 773 [2d Dept.
2017]).
Nonetheless, the Board must set forth an explanation for its determination in detail and not
just in conclusory terms (Executive Law§ 259-i[2](a]; Matter ofRamirez v. Evans, 118 AD3d 707
[2d Dept 2014];

Pe1feto v. Evans, 112 AD3d 640 [2d Dept 2013]). Absent a convincing
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demonstration to the contrary, it is presumed that the Board acted properly and in accordance with
statutory requirements (Matter of Hanson v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994 [2d Dept 2008];

People ex rel. Thomas v. Superintendent ofArthurkill Correctional Facility, 124 AD2d 848 [2d Dept
1986], app. denied 69 NY2d 611 [1987]). Before Court intervention is warranted in parole
dete1minations, the inmate must establish that the Board's decision was irrational "bordering on
impropriety" (Matter ofSilman v. Travis, supra at 476; Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd of Parole, 50
NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; Matter of Marzalek v. Stanford, 152 AD3d 773 [2d Dept 2017]; Matter of

1\1artinez v. NYS Div. of Parole, 73 AD3d 1067,1067 [2d Dept 2010]) and the decision was thus
arbitrary and capricious.
"Where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the
offense, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances, it acts irrationally" (Matter ofGelsomino

v. NYS Bd. ofParole, supra at I 098 [2d Dept 2011] citing Matter ofHuntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d 945,
947 (2d Dept 2010]; King v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 [!51 Dept 1993], aff'd 83 NY2d
788 [1994]). Whether the Board followed the proper guidelines should be assessed based upon the
written determination in conjunction with the parole hearing transcript (see Matter ofJackson v.

Evans, 118 AD3d 701, 702 [2d Dept 2014] citing Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 11 NY3d
777, 778 [2008]).
Although the respondent asserts that the Board may properly base its decision on the
seriousness of the offense and may place greater weight on the violence and brutality of the crimes,
as opposed to an inmate's institutional record, here neither the Board's decision nor the transcript
of the hearing articulate that as the reason for its decision. Rather, the Board merely set forth its
determination in conclusory terms in contravention ofthe law (Executive Law§ 259-i[2] [a]; Matter
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of Ramirez v. Evans, supra; Pe1feto v. Evans, supra).
Every murder conviction involves an unjustified taking of a human life. Yet the New York
State Legislature has determined that a murder conviction does not preclude parole, absent a showing
of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself (see Maller

of King v. NYS Div. of Parole, supra).
No particular length of sentence can bring back the victim or ease his family's pain and
suffering. The only variable that can change is whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated and can
safely be released to parole supervision.

The Legislature has determined that "rehabilitation is

possible and desirable" even for the most serious of crimes (see Matter ofRios v. NYS Division of

Parole,15 Misc.3d 1107(A) [Sup. Ct, Kings County 2007]).
Here, the sentencing Judge, with the consent of the District Attorney, imposed a sentence of
15 years to life. The Board does not explain in its decision how releasing Mr. Diaz after 27 years of
incarceration, 13 years more than the minimum sentence, would "so deprecate the serious nature of
the crime as to undermine respect for the law".
While a low COMP AS score does not entitle an inmate to parole release, the Board did not
discuss why it completely discounted Mr. Diaz's COMPAS scores and concluded that there is a
reasonable probability that he would not "live at liberty without violating the law".

The Court

cannot glean from the cursory nature of its decision how it utilized its own risk assessment
procedures in concluding that petitioner's release is incompatible with the welfare of society at this
time (Executive Law §259-c[4]). At the time of Mr. Diaz's hearing, the Board had proposed
amending its regulations to require that if a determination departs from the Risk and Needs
Assessment individualized reasons for such departure must be given (9 NYCRR §8002.2(a)). While
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this regulations was not in effect at the time of Mr. Diaz's hearing, the amendment is an indication
of the importance of risk assessment scores in assisting the Board in making appropriate parole
determinations2• Here there was a stark contrast between Mr. Diaz's scores and the Board's
conclusion without any explanation.
The record before the Court raises the inference that the Board's stated reasons for denying
petitioner parole release are merely pretextual and that its decision was predicated solely on the
nature of the offense. Based on all of the facts and circumstances of this case, notwithstanding the
seriousness of the underlying offense, the Board's decision to deny Mr. Diaz parole is unsuppo1ted
by the record and is therefore, irrational bordering on improper (Matter ofColeman v. NYS Dept of
Corrections & Community Supervision, 157 A.D.3d 672,[ 2d Dept. 2018]; Maller of Marino v.
Travis, 289 A.D.2d 493 (2d Dept. 2001]).
The petition is granted and the Board's decision dated April 26, 201 7 is annulled. The matter
is remanded to the Parole Board for a de novo parole release interview and review before a panel of
the Board consisting of members who have not been involved in this interview or prior interviews
involvingpetitioner(seeExecutiveLaw § 259-i [2][A]; Matter ofBanks v. Stanford, -NYS3d-,2018
WL 736148, 2018 NY Slip Op 00829 (2d Dept 2018). Such interview shall be held within 45 days
of the date of this decision.

In determining this application the Court has read and considered the following papers, as
well as the oral argument held on March 28, 2018: Notice of Petition (Ip.); Verified Petition (22
pp.) with Exhibits l-13; Reply (8 pp.) with Exhibits (A-J); Answer and Return 11 (pp.) with
Exhibits (I - 12); and the following submitted for in camera review: Exhibits I & 3, Parts II & III;

2

The new regulation became effective September 27, 2017 and will apply to Mr. Diaz's next hearing.
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Exhibit 12.
The materials submitted by respondent for in camera inspection are being returned to the
respondent's counsel; al l other papers are being transmitted to the Dutchess County Clerk for filing.
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Poughkeepsie, NY
April 4, 2018
ENTER:

H~~

ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTl CE lhat an appeal may be taken from an order of this Court to the Appellate Division Second
Department. Section 5513 of the CPLR provides that the appeal must be taken within thirty days after the entry and
service of any order from which the appeal is taken.

TO:

Jose Diaz, 95Al 155
Otisville Correctional Facility
PO Box 8
Otisville, New York 10963
COUNSEL:
Mark R. He! lerer
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
1540 Broadway
New York, NY 10036
Martha Rayner
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62 nd Street, 9111 floor
New York, NY 10023
Heather Rubenstein
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Poughkeepsie Regional Office
1 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401 .
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601-3194
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